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THE NEED FOR ADDED SAFIDUARDS

Investigation of "loyaltytt did not begin with the executive order
issued by Harry Truman on March 21. As far as the present generation of government employees is concerned, such inquiries became systematic and widespread during
the early months of the Nazi-Soviet pact. They were carried on throughout the war.
In the war years the Civil Service Corrunission itself investigated 395,000 employees.
Of these 1,300 were removed because there appeared "reasonable ground" for doubting
their loyalty.

Approximately 700 of this group were in the Communist category.

The FBI, Military and Naval intelligence,and other groups staged similar inquiries.
'
There were a bsurdities committed, as anybody who inhabited wartime Washington
knows. Yet in perspective it may appear more significant that we waged the most
far-flung war in our history without even faintly resembling a police state, that
the sporadic "terror" was usually more foolish than fierce, and that our liberties

�

survived the war without major scars

All of which merely suggests that the fact of investigation does not
automatically breed a disastrous witch hunt, and that a human equation - such as
the presence of such conscientious people as Arthur S . Flemming, Harry B. Mitchell,
and Frances Perkins as heads of the Civil Service Commission - can keep it from going
to excesses. But
volved

a.J?-d

our

wartime experience underlines the nature of the

the character of the safeguards that must be invoked.

risks in-

Fro:n what we

have learned it now seems clear that the success or failure of the "loyaltyt' inquiry will be determined by the resolution of these two unsettled questions:

1. Will accused employees receive protections that genuinely protect,
inspiring the confidence of honest men rather than offering a field day for amateur
and professional heresy hunters?

2 From "How to Rid the Government of Communists, " by James A. Wechsler, former
staff member of Nation Al.� PM, now in the Washington Bureau of the New York Post.
Harper's Magazine, 195:438-43. November, 1947. Reprinted by permission.

-22. Will we evolve criteria of judgment that plainly differentiate non
conformists(on the left or right) from participants in underground conspiratorial
movements run from a foreign capital or - ae in the case of pro-Fascists - clearly
identified with the now homeless Nazi international?
With respect to both questions the program enunciated by President
Truman on

March 21 was

•••

unsatisfactory and inadequate.

open to elaboration and refinement of that order.

But the door is still wide

A good many of the wiser officials

in the capital have been sweating over these questions ever since the statement was
promulgated. The important facts about contemporary Washington are that persons like
Flemming , Mitchell and Miss Perkins are deeply sensitive to the complexity of the
issues and that

the administration itself has shown little of the zeal for

irresponsible persecution suggested by some of the more thunderous outcries on the
left. Both Attorney General Clark and J. Edgar Hoover have manifested visible
concern over liberaJ

criticisms leveled against the tenns of

th��

Frogram. While

some

conscientious detractors have hinted that this concern was "purely political," it
is slightly gratuitous to complain when men in high office view liberal politics as
sound politics.
As the loyalty machinery now operates more than a million federal
employees will be subjected to at least routine review. (It is not true, as generally
imagined that all of them were investigated in wartime; tens of thousands went on
the government pay roll in those hectic years without any scrutiny). The FBI checks
their names against its own records and all other current dossiers of subversion ,
including the notoriously unreliable files compiled by the peerless peep-hole artists
of the House Un-American Activities Com:nittee.

If any "derogatory information" is

revealed in any of these documents, the FBI conducts further inquiry, forwards a report without recommendation - to the Civil Service Commission, which transmits the findings
to the agency involved.

If the administrator decides to act upon the data(and in

the current political weather the pressure to do so will be strong) he :must give the
accused a summary of the charges, a chance to testify before counsel before a departmental review board, and an opportunity to seek personal review by the agency head.
Then,

finally, the case may be carried to a new, over-all Civil Service Commission review

body which will presumably be composed of outstanding, disinterested citizens.
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So far all this might be classified as progress; it formalizes heretofore
shadowy rights of review and appeal and creates a supreme tribunal that is dependent
on neither Congress nor government for favor.

But the order also contains this

crucial joker:
The charges shall be stated as specifically and completely as, in
the discretion of the employing department or agency, security considera
tions pennit.
In effect, this means that the FBI will retain its authority to decide
how much of its case shall be disclosed.

It means the victim may receive only the

most fragmentary picture of the evidence on which he is being convicted and utterly
no chance to confront the witnesses whose words may exile him from government.
The traditional defense for this course is that a security agency
often cannot reveal the sourceS of its information - or even the full facts at its
command -without permanently destr?ying the usefulness of its informers. Since stoll
pigeons are the key figures in most investigative cases, this explanation cannot
glibly be thrown out of court.
But the exclusion of any man or woman from government service is also
serious business. Moreover, there are many cases in which informants are local
janitors, women scorned, and village idi>Ot.s who have no just claim to anonymity

•

.

Conceding that the problem isn't simple, the solution clearly rests in the
hands of the proposed national review board and its regional counterparts.
This board must be empowered, in cases that it holds doubtful and
inconclusive, to require the FEI to produce the full details of its findings and
the witnesses from whom it was obtained. Admittedly this may make life tougher
for the political G-�en. But once again alternatives lllllSt be closely weighed.
The board's activities will also be gravely hampered if no records
are kept of the lower-level.hearings that precede final appeal. Each case will come
up cold, with only tte bare outline of general charge and categorical denial. All
the previous appeals will be little more than waste motion.
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Te chnically the decisions of the top board will be only 11adv�sory.11
However, this is probably a verbal quibble, since few administrators will be likely
to defy its conclusion, and most of them will welcome its existence as a powerful
moral backstop for themselves.
Given these procedural weapons the review board can become a decisive
restraint on reckless congressional clamor for a wholesale _purge.

It can help

to take the issue of national security out of the dreary realm of partisan politics.
It can give renewed courage to administrators who now defend the suspect at the risk
of their own ��. And it can undermine the impresssion widely whispered in government
circles that an argument with the FBI(or Congress) is a form of administrative suicide.
For while the FBI reports are deadpan and no recommendation is set forth, their
existence periodically "leaks" in wondrous ways. Congressmen can demand them and congressional "sources" are often remarkably outspol5;en.
Simultaneously the standards set forth in the order must be painstakingly
clarified. Actually the Civil Service Corrunission made substantial progress in this
direction during the war.

Its progress may be nulli.fi ed by some of the loose language

in the loyalty order. Back in March 1942 President Roosevelt issued war service·
regulations which held that one of the grounds for disqualification for a federal
employee was "the existence of a reasonable doubt of his loyalty to the government
of the United States.11But loyalty, as Professor Commager pointed out, has become
a badly battered word. What we really mean is the existence of a competing allegiance
so strong and clear that the person involved cannot be trusted inside a government
office.
This problem is enormously complicated by emergence of the "fellow
..

traveler" as a classic political phenomenon of our times. As the Canadian spy
,

revelations showed, the fellow traveler may in some instances be just a well-intentioned
fellow whose thoughts have been traveling along paths parallel to Communist lines; he
may, however, be a clandestine party member who, for reasons of safety, is spared the
fonnality of signing a part� card.

v
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Because the Conununists, like the Nazis, have leaned so heavily on men
who lead political lives, it is not enough to say that full proof of membership in
the Communist party must be shown before any dismissal can occur. Under this criteria
some of the most elusive and important Couum.inist operatives might escape, while the
clumsiest and least significant were apprehended.
In an effort to resolve this difficulty the loyalty order invoked the
dangerous doctrine of guilt by association. The Department of Justice is now preparing
a list of "proscribed" organizations held to be Corrmunist or Fascist fronts.

The

Attorney General, in response to protests, has indicated that a least some of these
organizations will be given a hearing

before he hands down his ruling. But that

doesn't settle everything. The crucial question is the significance that will be
attached to membership in one of the organizations listed.
Mr. Clark might hold With some justification that the Southern Conference
for Human Welfare has been utilized as a front for the Communists. Does that mean that
Dr. Frank Graham, 'who has bitterly fought the Communists for control of the Con
ference but refused to abandon his membership in �t, shall be barred from goverrunent
employment? The question suggests the possible absurdity of the standard.
Mr. Flemming has indicated a far more plausible approach. "An employee
will be dismissed only if evidence of membership in such an organization, plus al.l
the other evidence in the case, lead� to the conclusion that reasonable grounds exist
for believing that he is disloyal to the govern.�ent of the United States", he said
recently. The order uses similar language, but it is later c �o uded· by extensive
reference to nassociation."
In effect Mr. Flerruning is saying that the total pattern of behavior
of the accused will be reviewed and a wide variety of human experience evaluated.
Such subtleties are the qualities that distinguish reasonable inquiry from
frenzied inquisition.

Yet it should also be noted at this point that the Attorney

General is given enormous "blacklist" authority, since membership in a front organization
is the equivalent of at least one strike on the enployee. Certainly the projected
review board should have the right to make this final determination of "proscribed"

-&-

groups, perhaps with the Attorney General occupying the role of prosecutor once he
has reached his own decisions.
The recent dismissal of ten State Department employees - without

hearings or even recitation of charges - forcibly dramatized the need for the safeguards outlined here.

It also underlined what is not generall7 appreciated - that State,

the military departments, and the Atomic Energy Commission run

their own "purges" and

more than 500,000 employees are thus not currently covered by even the limited pro
tections of the President's executive order. State's arbitrary powers to fire(which
the Department itself apparently reconsidered and modified in the case of the ten)
derive fran a · congressional rider to its apropriation. The armed services invoke
similarly
a wartime security statute. Ato:nic Energy/�onaucts its own security affairs by
congressional sanction(or demand). There is little justification for this separation.
The g-�arantees that preserve integrity and imagination in govern:nent are surely no
less needed in the State Department than in agencies far removed fro� the diplo:natic

battlefield;. and the same thing applies to the domain of the brass and braid.
There are some who contend that the whole loyalty program should be
applied only to 11sensitive11 agencies, pointing out that the Labor Department or,
let us say , the Fish and Wild Life Service would offer poor hunting ground

for a

foreign agent. Since military intelligence is primarily the art of correlating
strangely diverse data, the argument is more entertaining than valid. Yet the
review board might appropriately fix tighter· standards for State, Atomic Energy,
and the anned services than for clearly peripheral agencies. It could be plausibly
argued that the 11burden of proof" rests on the governme nt in a non-security agency
but that "reasonable doubttt would justify dismissal in the more strategic areas.
It would also seem sensible to permit resignation without prejudice in any case

short of

an

overt act.
In most of these matters the soWldest course would be to let the re-

view board draw these faint shadings rather than seek an advance blueprint.
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The risks projected when police methods are applied to government
will not be dissipated overnight even if the proposed review board consists of twenty
of our wisest Solomons,

Perhaps the most serious threat is the least tangible -

the possibility tha t men in government will strive ostentatiously to conform, �hat
the super-patrioteer will become a model public servant and the unorthodox mind will seek
more congenial surroundings.
Dramatic and affirmative effort by t.he administration is plainly
needed in view of the deepening

demoralization in the government service. The

caliber of the men appointed to the review board will decisively affect this
atmosphere. They must conunand sufficient respect to withstand a change in national
administration.

They must dwarf the professional "know-no things" in Congress. I

know that such men are being earnestly sought.

Their appointment mu�t be

accompanied by an emphatic clarification of the language used in the loyalty
order,

a swift assertion of-the powers they will invoke, and a revised statement

of the objectives of the inquir y.
With such moves the W�:t�<nair could be freshened
crats who view

the loyalty prote

The petty bureau

as a chance to plant knives in the back of

competitors might be seriously discouraged; the citizen who wants to work for his
government would no longer feel he was helpless prey for invisible informers. The
11know-nothins11 would promptly charge that the administration was "softening" again;
the Communists would cry that these are empty bourgeois gestures. But the in
stinctive decency 0£ American opinion would be crystallized . The same Gallup polls
that show widespread support for exclusions of Corrununists from government also
endorse full hearings for the accused.
The resilience of democratic society has repeatedly proved greater
than the extreme right and extreme left have acknowledged. It faces a new test now.
Out on the basis of the evidence so far, the reports of democracy's death have once
again been exaggerated. The loyalty program, despite a bad beginning, can still ma.�e
sense .

/
Relationship of the Loyalty Program to the Hatch Act,
Section 9(a) and the various appropriations acts

section 9(a) of the Hatch Act makes it unlawful for any employee
of the

Fede�al Government to have membership in any political party or organization

which advocates the overthrow of our Constitutional form of government in the
United States.

The Attorney General has designated certain organizations, which

he lists from time to time, as being within the scope of the Hatch Act.

He

has also designated certain additional organizations in accordance with the
provis ions of Execut i v e

Order 9835

as organizations

which seek to alter the

form of the government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
The Loyalty Review Board has considered the language used in the
Hatch Act, in the Executive Order and in the various appropriations acts which
forbid payment of salary or wages to any person who advocates, or who is a
member of

an

organization that advocates,the overthrow of

the government of

the United States by force or violence, and has determined that the language
from each source has a common meaning and that such language should be similarly
construed and applied in the adjudication of cases arising under Executive Order
9835.
Therefore , in accorda nc e with the designation of the Attorney General,
present membership in any of the organizations designated by the Attorney General
as being within the scope of Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act, or as seeking to
alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means, or
present advocacy by an individual of the overthrow of the government of the
United States by force or violence, for the purpose of adjudication of c ases under
�ecutive Order 9835, should be considered as bringing the case within the purview
of Section 9(a) of the Hatch Act and the various appropriations acts that are
referred to; and, if in the consideration of a case, a Loyalty Review Board finds
as a fact that en employee or an applicant is a member of such an organization, or
that he advocates the overthrow of the government of the United States by force or
violence, then the removal of the employee, or the refusal of the employee to the

,

applicant is mandatory.

The standard � �

applied

!!:! determining loyalty

The standard to be employed for the refusal of employment or
for the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on
grounds relating to loyalty under Executive Order

9835 shall

be that, on

all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person
involved is disloyal to the government of the United States.

The decision

shall be reached after consideration of the complete file, arguments, briefs
and testimony presented.
The Executive Order itself enwnerates certain illustrative
activities and associations which may be considered in connection with the
determination of disloyalty.

It is this portion of the Executive Order

particularly paragraph 6 referring to membership in, affiliation with, or
sympathetic association with organization, or a group of persons designated
by the Attorney General as subversive which gives rise to the accusation
that the whole program deals with guilt by association.
It is to be stressed, however, that membership, affiliation or
sympathetic association is merely one piece of evidence which may or may not
be helpful :inarriving at a conclusion
in a particular case.

as to the action which is to be taken

Of course, if present memb ership in the Communi st

Party or organizations listed by the Attorney General a s coming within the
purview of the Hatch Act is found, then
of employee is mandatory.

the refusal of entployment or removal

C?
v

Contents of Interrogatory and Covering Letter

The interrogatory and covering letter, requested. above, shall state:

(1)

The nature of the evidence against him in factual detail ,

setting forth with particularity the fac ts and circumBtances so far as
security

considerations per:1lit in order to enable the applicant or appointee

to $Ubmit his answer, defense or explanation.

(2)

His right to reply to the interrogatory in writing, under oath

or affirmation, within ten

(10)

calendar days of the date of receipt by him

of the interrogatory.

(3)

His right to have an administrative hearing on the issues before

the Regional Loyalty Board, upon his request.

(4)

His right to appear before such Board personally, to be

represented by counsel or representative of his own choosing,and to present
evidence in his behalf.

H)

( ,. >I)

./

Contents of Notice of Proposed Removal Action

The notice of proposed removal action required on the preceding
page shall state to the employee:
(1) The charges against

him

in factual detail, setting forth

with particularity the facts and circumstances re�ating to the charges
so far as security considerations will permit,in order to enable the
employee to submit

his answer, defense or explanation.

(2) His right to answer the charges in writing, under oath
or affirmation, within a specified reasonable period of time, not le �s
than ten(lO) calendar days from the date of the receipt by the employee
of the notice.

(3)

His rig ht

to

have

an

administrative hearing

on the charges

before a Loyalty ite·R:sw Board in the Agency, upon his request.
(4) His right to appear before such Board personally, to be
represented by counsel or representative of his own choosing, and to pre
sent evidence in his behalf.
(5) The work and pay status in which he will be carried during

the period of the notice or until the determination of the Agency Loyalty
Board.
(6) The fact that the proposed removal action will not become
effective in less than thirty(JO) calendar days from the date of receipt
by the employee of the notice.

(7) The authority or authorities(Ex:ecutive Order 9835 and any
applicable statutes, such as section 9A of the Hatch Act and/or section 14
of the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944) under which the notice is being
sent.

